The China Quarterly Chinese armies briefly asserted control over the Pamirs during the Tang Dynasty (AD 618-907). Somewhat more recently, in 1759, Chinese control over the Pamirs was re-established when a Chinese army advanced as far west as Shugan and Wakhan on the right bank of the Amu-Darya River.' These Chinese raised a fort on the shores of Yeshi] Kul and erected a marker commemorating their recent conquest of the region and attesting to China's ownership of the t e r r i t o r~.~ Once again Chinese control soon faded and the Pamirs became a part of the Kokand Khanate -which was itself a nominal tributary of the Chinese Empire.' seems that China did, however, retain a foothold in the upper Ak Su River valley; as late as the 1840s Chinese authority extended as far westwards as Zor Kul (also known as Lake Victoria and Wood's Lake). 6 During the mid 19th century British and Russian Empire builders were both expanding their influence in the direction of the Pamirs. To avoid conflict, the two governments reached an agreement in 1872-73 establishing the Amu-Darya River as far east as Zor Kul as the dividing line between their respective spheres of influence.' This agreement placed the right bank of the Amu-Darya within the Russian sphere. At that time, however, there seems to have been no significant Russian presence in that area. Indeed, the typography of the region was still only poorly understood.
In 1875-76 Kokand was conquered by Russia, its territory annexed into the Russian Empire as Fergana O b l a~t .~ China did not protest. Russian exploration of the Pamirs proceeded rapidly after the fall of Kokand. In 1876 a Russian expedition crossed the Alai Mountains and may have proceeded as far south as Uz Be1 Pass.' Two years later a Russian expedition advanced as far south as Yeshil Kul. By 1878 the Russian frontier had been established some 80 miles south of Kizil-Jik.
In 1881 yet another exploratory expedition charted the Shugan area. During 1883 further expeditions explored most of the Pamirs from Tash Kurgan to the eastern approaches of Roshan and Shugan.
After the fall of Kokand the notorious Yaqub Beg, the then ruler of Kashgaria, sent troops across the Sarikol range into the Pamirs.Io Kirghiz nationals from the Pamirs were recruited into Beg's forces and fought in Kashgaria, as did the Mir of Wakhan. Beg was also married to the daughter of the Mir of Shugan. These developments formed the basis of a later Chinese claim that the Pamirs constituted part of Yaqub Beg's realm.
In 1876 the Chinese Government launched its campaign t o " pacify " sinkiang.I1 By the end of 1877 Yaqub Beg was dead and Chinese forces were in control of his Kashgaria kingdom. The Chinese claimed that Beg's realm had extended as far westwards as Shugan, Wakhan and Badakhshan, and that as successor to Beg, the Chinese emperor was the rightful ruler of this region.'' A Chinese army e~t e r e d the eastern Pamirs in 1879 to defeat a pretender to the Kashgar throne, and in the early 1880s Chinese troops were stationed at various points throughout the eastern Pamirs. In 1883 Chinese troops challenged a Russian detachment near Rang Kul and asked why they had come to China without first notifying Chinese authorities in Kashgar. In the western regions of Rushan, Shugan and Wakhan, however, Chinese authority was eliminated in 1883 by Afghan invaders.
In 1884 Russia and China signed a protocol to the Treaty of St. Petersburg, which Peking now insists is the sole legal basis for the determination of the boundary in this region.ll Contending Chinese and Soviet claims have been made regarding this treaty. A close comparison of these claims with the original text permits some clarification of the issues. The Chinese text of the treaty can be found in a collection of documents edited by Yuan Tung-li.14 The preamble to the protocol specifies that its purpose is to define the boundary between Russia's Semirechensk province and China's Kashgar along the Tien Shan range, and between Russia's Fergana province and the western boundary of China's Kashgar " from Tuiun Souiok Mountain southwards to Uz Bel [here a second Chinese name is listed] Mountain where it terminates " (yingzi Tuyongsuyueke shanhou, wangnan zhi Wuzi youzuo Wuzai bieli shanhuo weizhi). Article three of the protocol states that " the boundary of the two countries terminates at this [Uz Bell Mountain " (liangguo jiexian, zhici shanhuo weizhi). However, the protocol then states that from this mountain " the Russian boundary turns to the south-west. The Chinese boundary runs straight south." (Eguo jiexian, zhuanxiang xinan. Zhongguo jiexian, yizhi wangnan). These lines were depicted on a map published in Peking in 1978 illustrating " Czarist Russian Seizure and Occupation of Chinese Territory."
The purpose of this rather ambiguous formulation (of specifing boundaries beyond the point where the boundary is said to end) is unclear. As Alder points out, a line running due south from Uz Bel I 4 corresponds to no natural features whatsoever ";IS nor does a line running towards the south-west, for that matter. It is possible that this was not clear in 1884, however. The typography of the region may have been only very roughly understood. Indeed, a map drawn up by a British expedition in 1874 shows a range of mountains extending due south from Uz Bel Pass almost to the Murgab River.16 But if the Russian exploratory activity of the previous few years is any indication, it seems likely that by 1884 the Russians, at least, had a more accurate idea of the topography of this region.
The last sentence of section three of the 1884 protocol specifies that all land draining to the west of the specified boundary line is Russian, while all lands draining to the east of the specified boundary line is Chinesethus implying that the common boundary follows the watershed. If this principle were extended to the south of Uz Bel Pass, the Sarikol range could form the only such east-west watershed. It is not clear, however, whether this watershed principle was meant to apply south of UZ Be1
Pass. The protocol specifies very clearly that the common Sino-Russian boundary ends at Uz Bel. From that point the boundaries of the two countries are to diverge. It thus seems likely that the watershed principle was intended to refer only to the mutual borderline north of Uz Bel.
The 1884 protocol in effect created a wedge of no-man's-land emcompassing much of the Pamirs. This may have been precisely Russia's objective; Russian strategy during this period was to prevent delimitation of boundaries which would block her advance further south." AS an official Russian military publication stated in 1880:
The extent o f country between the most southern portion of the province of Russia's dominions, which will thus be in immediate contact with the range forming the water-parting from the Indus.''
Whatever Russian and Chinese intentions in 1884, a strict intepretation of the text of the 1884 protocol does substantiate Peking's claim that from the U z Be1 Pass " the Russian boundary runs to the south-west. The Chinese boundary runs straight south." The Soviet claim that the 1884 protocol " Bears no relation whatever to the Pamirs region, as anyone who takes the trouble to look at this protocol can see for himself," is more questionable, although one must agree with In 1884 Russia and Britain agreed to the demarcation of Afghanistan's northern border.?' By 1887 the joint commission created for this purpose had completed its work, following the 1872-73 agreement in fixing the boundary along the course of the Amu-Darya River as far east as Zor Kul. East of Zor Kul the boundary was left undefined.
In the early 1890s both the British and the Russians were pushing forward their lines of control towards the Karakorurn passes.?' Each move by one side provoked a counter-advance by the other. Russia's main objective was to achieve a common boundary with British India. From such a position it could exert pressure on a very sensitive point of the British Empire. Were London to adopt a hostile policy towards Russia elsewhere in the world, Petersburg could respond by instigating and supporting rebellions against British rule among the tribal peoples of the northern frontiers, or within India itself. It could also threaten invasion, which although unlikely, would force Britain to maintain very expensive positions in India's far north.
British strategists hoped t o stop the Russian advance well north of the Karakorurn passes and to keep a strip of " neutral " territory separating Russian from British lands.22 It was a matter of secondary importance t o London whether this " buffer " belonged to China o r Afghanistan. Great Britain desired that both China and Afghanistan assert effective control over the southern and eastern Pamirs, and that their territories touch, thus blocking Russia's southern march. In order to " close the gap " between Afghani and Chinese territory, Great Britain urged China to send troops into the Pamirs as far west as Yashil Kul -where Chinese territory would butt against Afghanistan. London embodied its plan in a formal proposal to China in 1891 that a strip of Chinese territory extend westwards along the Alichure River to S o m a t a~h .~~ While Peking was deciding how far west its territory extended into the Pamirs, Russia moved to assert its rights under the 1873 and 1887 agreements with Great Britain. In the spring of 1891 a detachment of 1,000 cossacks was sent into the Pamirs and proceeded south to Baroghil pass where they clased with Afghan forces.16 ,The Russian force then penetrated further south, crossing the Hindu Kush, and advancing as far as the summit of Darkot Pass.17 The detachment then withdrew northwards, founding Fort Pamir on the Urgab River as the focus of Russian power in the eastern Pamirs. While moving through the Pamirs the Russian expedition informed the local inhabitants (mostly Khirghiz) that they were now Russian subjects and ordered out a number of Chinese soldiers and officials (and at least one British official).28 The Russians also removed the marker erected by the Chinese some years before on the shore of Yeshil K U I .~~ On the eastern shore of Kara Kul the local inhabitants were discovered building a fort under Chinese orders.I0 A garrison of 200-300 troops was left at Fort Pamir and the rest of the Russian expeditionary force withdrew to Fergana.) ' Initially, it seems, China resisted the Russian thrust. After the Russian troops left in 1891 Chinese troops returned to the Pamirs and removed the local officials appointed by the Russians -officials who had themselves been appointed to replace Chinese-appointed officials." Chinese troops also were sent to repair and reinforce the forts at Rang Kul, Yashil Kul and Ak Tash. However, faced with growing Russianand Afghani -pressure, and unsure of British plans, China decided to withdraw from the contested territory. In the spring of 1892 Chinese Sino-Russian talks on the Pamirs question began in 1892.'"ussia insisted that the boundary follow the Sarikol range. The Chinese Government was divided over Pamirs policy. One group, initially led by Li Hung-chang, favoured maintaining Chinese claims as far west as the line running due south from Uz Bel Pass. Another faction headed by Hun Ta-jen favoured the abandonment of territory to the west of the Sarikol range. For two yearsalittle progress was made. By 1894 tension was building between China and Japan over Korea and Li Hung-chang had come to the conclusion that Russian help should be sought to resist Japan's a d~a n c e .~' In order to make possible such co-operation, the Pamirs issue had to be solved, or at least shelved. Petersburg, too, hoped for Sino-Russian co-operation against Japan and was willing to give guarantees that its troops would remain west of the Sarikol watershed in order to facilitate such co-operation.
Thus, notes were exchanged establishing the Sarikol range crestline as the de facto dividing line between Chinese and Russian jurisdiction. It is these notes which Moscow now says constitute the legitimate definition of the boundary in this region: " The demarcation in the Pamirs was accomplished by means of an exchange of notes in 1894. . . . This line exists and no other."38 While the 1894 notes have apparently never been published, Peking has purportedly quoted them at length. According to China, the notes were explicitly a " provisional agreement " intended to " maintain temporarily the respective positions of the troops of the two sides pending a final settlement of the Pamir q u e s t i~n . " '~ The Chinese Government is said to have specified in these notes that: 
Current Chinese Claims
There are at least three differing Chinese claims in the Pamirs region. The first encompasses the region to the eas! of a line running due south from U z Bel Pass to a point on the Afghan border near the eastern end of Lake Zor Kul. The area to the east of such a line, and west of the Sarikol range crestline, is roughly 20,000 square kilometres -the area Peking has specified as being held by the Soviet Union in excess of the legitimate boundary. This is the clearest Chinese claim, and the minimum claim.
A second claim can be formulated on the basis o f a line running from U z Bel Pass towards the south-west -which Peking says is the Russian boundary as specified by the 1884 protocol. The 1978 illustrative map hints that this wedge o f land might properly be Chinese territory by shading it yellow, the same colour as " China " on that map. The 1978 edition of this study, however, shows a Chinese territorial claim in the Pamirs apparently corresponding t o this Nationalist claim.4h This is somewhat misleading in implying that this " maximum " claim is in fact the People's Republic expressed claim.
The satisfaction of any one of these three Chinese claims would have geo-political consequences. In the first instance, they would substantially increase the size of the Sino-Afghan border: by 180 kilometres in the case of the first claim; by 420 kilometres with the second claim; and by a total of 675 kilometres in the case of the maximum, third claim. The current Sino-Afghan boundary ranges some 80 kilometres. The satisfaction of either the maximum Chinese claim or the cession of the south-western " wedge," would also put a strip of Chinese territory between the Soviet Union and Pakistan's port of Kashmir. This would make China's tenuous overland links with Pakistan somewhat more secure.47 It would also lessen the ability of the Soviet Union to pressure Pakistan, China's only ally in Asia. O n the other hand, the transfer of a piece of territory to the east of a line running south from Uz Bel Pass would have minimal consequences in both regards.
In the past the Soviet Union has hinted a willingness to negotiate China's territorial claims -perhaps including those in the Pamir's region.48 One can speculate that Moscow might be willing to make a concession regarding the area east of a line south from Uz Bel' pass if that were the price of reaching an overall settlement of the boundary question. Given the territorial disputes outstanding with a number of countries, Moscow would, of course, be hesitant to make such a move, But then, China is a " special case." In this vein, Zhores Medvedev suggested in 1979 that if the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty 11 were rejected by the U.S. Senate, MOSCOW would " move seriously to improve its relations with China."49 A renewal of the cold war might induce Moscow to make concessions in the Pamirs if this would detach Peking from its alignment with the west and lay the basis for reduced SovietChinese tension.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 significantly increased the geopolitical significance of the Pamirs issue. China sees the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan as one step in a long range Soviet drive to bring Iran and Pakistan under Soviet control in order ultimately to establish naval supremacy in the lndian Ocean area and bring the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf under Soviet control.50 The next step in this scheme would be to support successionist and " pro-Soviet " forces within Pakistan. Indeed, the Soviet administrative " annexation " of the Wakhan corridor of Afghanistan in late 1980 was part of Moscow's plan to " penetrate into Pakistan's northern border area to gravely imperil the security of P a k i~t a n . "~' Peking believes, however, that " it is impossible for [Moscow] to exercise effective and long term control " over Afghanistan, and that the growing Afghanistan anti-Soviet guerrilla forces will inspire resistance to Soviet expansionism elsewhere. It is undoubtedly for these reasons that China is aiding the Afghani resistance forces. While Chinese concessions over the Sarikol line would not materially affect the security of the Sino-Pakistani highways through Kashmir or bring Soviet arms closer to anti-government rebels in Pakistan (since the Pamirs, the Wakhan, and Afghanistan are already under Soviet control) such moves would politically weaken the antihegemonist struggle and united front.
From the Soviet point of view, determination to consolidate the control of a friendly regime in Kabul would make folly of any lengthening of the Sino-Afghan border. The move into Afghanistan has thus made it less likely that either side will compromise on the Pamlrs territorial issue. What was previously a piece of land with marginal geopolitical importance has become far more valuable. 
